THEORETICAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL ASPECTS CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COURT APPEAL ON POINTS OF LAW by Marius ANDREESCU
THEORETICAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL ASPECTS CONCERNING 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COURT APPEAL ON POINTS 
OF LAW 
Marius ANDREESCU
 
Abstract 
The  institution  of  the  appeal  on  points  of  law  has  the  role  to  ensure  a  unitary  law 
interpretation and enforcing by the law courts. The legal nature of this procedure is determined not 
only by the civil and criminal normative dispositions that regulate it. In this study we bring arguments 
according to which this institution is of a constitutional nature, because according to the Constitution, 
the High Court of Cassation and Justice has the attribution to ensure the unitary interpretation of the 
law by the law courts. Thus are analyzed the constitutional nature consequences of this institution, the 
limits of compulsoriness of law interpretations given by the Supreme Court through the decisions 
ruled on this procedure, and also the relationship between the decisions of the Constitutional Court, 
respectively the decisions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice given for resolving the appeals 
on points of law. The recent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court reveals new aspects regarding 
the possibility to verify the constitutionality of the decisions given in this matter.  
Keywords: Appeal on points of law/ the compulsoriness of the law interpretations for 
the  law  courts/  /  The  control  of  constitutionality  of  the  decisions  given  for  resolving  the 
appeals on points of law/ Supremacy of Constitution 
1. Introduction 
Such as its name is showing and such as results from the legal dispositions in the 
matter (Article 514-518 Civil Procedure Code and Article 471 - 474 of the new Criminal 
Procedure Code, respectively Article 414
2 -414
5 in the Criminal Procedure Code in force), the 
appeal on points of law is no remedy way with effects on the situation between the parties in 
the  trial,  but  to  ensure  the  unitary  interpretation  and  application  of  the  substantial  and 
procedural laws throughout the entire country.  Such a legal institution would not be required 
if all appeals shall be heard by the High Court of Cassation and Justice. In such a case the 
Supreme  Court  may  achieve  the  unitary  interpretation  and  application  of  the  law.  The 
normative regulations in force however establish the competence of the law courts and appeal 
courts in solving the appeal, which creates the possibility to have a different interpretation, 
even a wrong one of the laws. Therefore the legal institution of the appeal on points of law 
has the purpose to ensure in a unitary mode across the entire country, the observance of the 
will of legislator expressed within the law spirit and letter.  
We consider that the legal nature of the appeal on points of law arises only from the 
civil and criminal procedural provisions which consecrate it. 
In compliance with the provisions of Article 126 paragraph (3) of the Constitution 
“The High Court of Cassation and Justice ensures the unitary interpretation and application of 
the  law  by  other  law  courts,  according  to  its  competencies”.  The  decisions  given  in  the 
proceeding of appeal on points of law represents the main means through which the Supreme 
Court fulfills the constitutional duty to ensure a unitary interpretation and application of the 
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law. That’s why, the appeal on points of law is not only a civil and criminal procedural 
institution, but at the same time, has its legal basis in the constitutional norm named above.  
The constitutional nature of the appeal on points of law has two main consequences. 
The  first  refers  to  the  obligation  of  the  legislator  to  regulate  in  the  civil  and  criminal 
proceeding, the juridical instrument through which the High Court of Cassation and Justice 
may  accomplish  its  constitutional  prerogative  to  ensure  the  unitary  interpretation  and 
application of the laws by all law courts. The legislator has at his disposition two possibilities: 
the first may be to regulate the exclusive competence of the Supreme Court in resolving all 
appeals and the second, the procedure this is currently regulated, of the appeal on points of 
law. The constitutional provision contained by Article 126 paragraph 3 of the Constitution 
represents a guarantee of the fundamental law. Given the principle of conformity of the whole 
law with the constitutional norms, the legislator cannot regulate the material competence of 
the Supreme Court without having instituted also the procedural instrument through which 
this will ensure the unitary interpretation and application of the laws by all law courts.  
The second consequence refers to the necessity of compliance of the decisions ruled in 
this proceeding with the constitutional norms. The decisions of the High Court of Cassation 
and Justice shall be limited strictly to the interpretation of the law. The Supreme Court may 
complete, amend or repeal the regulations contained by the law.  Otherwise it will be violated 
the principle of separation and balance of powers in the state, explicitly consecrated by the 
provisions of Article 1 paragraph 4 of the Constitution, because the law court exceeded the 
limits of judicial powers and would manifest itself as a legislative authority. We will refer to 
this consequence in chapter II of the present study.   
2. Paper Content 
One of the most important aspects of the legal regimes that is specific to the appeal on 
points of law is the compulsoriness of law interpretation by the courts.  
The constitutionality of the regulations that consecrates in the civil and criminal matter 
the  obligation  of  the  decisions  given  in  the  proceeding  for  appeal  on  points  of  law  was 
contested both in the doctrine
1 as throughout the exceptions of non-constitutionality solved by 
the Constitutional Court, in relation to the provisions of  Article 124 paragraph (3) of the 
Constitution, which establishes the principle of judge submission only  to the law. The 
Constitutional Court in its jurisprudence has constantly stated that the statutory provisions that 
foresee the courts’ obligation of the “law interpretations” given by the Supreme Court through 
the decisions rendered points of law are constitutional
2. Our Constitutional Court has held 
that: “The principle of submission to the law, according to Article 123 paragraph (2) of the 
Constitution  (presently  Article  124  paragraph  (3)  n.m.)  has  not  and  cannot  have  the 
significance of a different applying, or even in contradictory of the same legal provision based 
solely on the subjectivity of the interpretation belonging to different judges”
3. However it has 
been noted that: “The ensuring of the unitary character of the practice of law is imposed also 
by the constitutional principle of equality of the citizens before the law and public authorities, 
therefore including before the legal authorities, because this principle would be otherwise 
severely affected, if in the application of one and the same law, the solution rendered by the 
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law courts would be different or even in contradictory
4. A topic of interest for our research 
study  and  for  the  substanti ation  of  the  constitutional  court  according  to  which:  ”The 
establishing of the compulsoriness character of the interpretations of the law issues judged by 
means of appeal on points of law, is only giving efficiency to the High Court of Cassation and 
Justice, contributing thus to the lawful state’s consolidation
 5.  
In the separate opinion formulated by the Decision no. 221/2010 it is claimed that the 
normative provisions establishing the compulsoriness for the courts of the decisions rendered 
on  points  of  law,  are  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  Article  124  paragraph  (3)  of  the 
Constitution. The author of the separate opinion emphasizes: “In this meaning we believe that 
providing a unitary interpretation has the significance of taking the needed actions for the 
unitary understanding, interpretation of the norm by each judge, of its letter and spirit, and not 
of offering/ imposing a certain solution, to the interpretation in a certain sense. The judge 
cannot be brought in the situation of an obedient executor, in relation to the interpretations 
given in resolving the appeal on points of law”.
6 
From the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, of the doctrine in 
the matter, but  also  of  the regulations in  the fundamental  law, one  can conclude that no 
constitutional text foresees clearly the compulsoriness of the decisions rendered by the High 
Court of Cassation and Justice, on points of law. Therefore, the compulsory character of such 
decisions for the law courts is not of a constitutional nature. The compulsoriness is conferred 
exclusively by the special regulations, to which we referred to in the Civil Procedure Code 
and, respectively the Criminal Procedure Code. We appreciate that it is necessary to achieve 
the distinction between the constitutional nature of the appeal on points of law, and on the 
other side, the constitutional character of the compulsoriness of the decisions ruled for the law 
courts.  
The  binding  character  of  the  “interpretation  of  law”  given  by  the  High  Court  of 
Cassation and Justice cannot be considered as an equivalent with the compulsoriness of the 
law norm. Therefore, the judge, in the work of interpretation and application of law, will have 
into  consideration,  firstly,  the  regulations  with  normative  character,  including  the 
constitutional  ones  and,  in  subsidiary,  the  interpretation  and  the  “clarifications  of  law” 
conferred through the procedural decisions given in the procedure of appeal on points of law. 
We appreciate that the procedural provisions that establish the compulsoriness character of 
such decisions are constitutional related with the provisions of Article 124 paragraph (3) of 
the Constitution, only in so far as it is interpreted that such an obligation does not prejudice 
the  constitutional  principle  according  to  which  the  judges  must  grant  priority  and  give 
efficiency to the law norms applicable in solving the cause and only in subsidiary, to the 
decisions rendered in this procedure.  
At this time a scientific approach of the issue mentioned above would appear useless, 
having into consideration that the legislator eliminated, at least for the judges, any possibility 
to  reflect  upon  this  topic,  because  through  the  Law  no.  24/2012  were  brought  important 
amendments in the sphere of disciplinary judicial misbehaviors of the judges, so that Article 
99 letter s of Law 301/2004, in the form acquired throughout the normative act named above, 
establishes as a disciplinary misconduct “the non complying with the decisions given by the 
High Court of Cassation and Justice in resolving the appeal on points of law”. It is regrettable 
such a brutal intervention of the legislator which, in our opinion, affects not only the scientific 
approach upon such a delicate matter, but it limits unconstitutionally the independence of the 
judges. The above named law test raises a concrete practical problem for the judges, namely 
how will the law court proceed in situation there are contradictions between a decision of the 
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Constitutional  Court  and  a  decision  of  the  High  Court  of  Cassation  and  Justice  given  in 
resolving the appeal on points of law, both applicable in a case deduced to the judgment?  
In the literature in specialty this problem was indicated previously to amending and 
completing of Law no. 303/2004 by Law no. 24/2011, having into consideration the concrete 
situation  when  the  law  courts  faced  such  contradictions  between  the  decisions  of  the 
Constitutional Courts and the decisions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice given in 
the procedure of appeal on points of law, both categories of decisions having as matter the 
same text of law applicable in a case deduced to  the judgment
7. The author of the study 
which we are referring to concludes in the sense that: “Therefore in the given situation, the 
law courts, ascertaining contradictions between the decision of the Constitutional Court and 
the one of the united sections of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, must comply to 
those stated by the Constitutional Court and remove those decisions decided by the United 
Sections of the High Court of Cassation and Justice”
8.  The solution we consider as logic and 
justified as a judicial reasoning but presently inapplicable, having into consideration the law 
text that sanctions as disciplinary misconduct both equally the non-abiding of the decisions of 
the High Court of Cassation and Justice regarding the compulsory interpretations given for 
resolving some law issues, as the decisions of the Constitutional Court. It is obvious that the 
judge  is  facing  a  insoluble  dilemma  and  he  is  subjected  to  a  constraint  that  is  severely 
prejudicing his independence, because no matter what solution will be rendered, he will be 
liable for disciplinary responsibility for failure, as the case may be, either of the decision of 
the Constitutional Court or of the decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice. It 
should be noted that no legal provision in the procedure for the judicial control is sanctioning 
the non-abiding of the compulsoriness of the decisions of the Supreme Court that were given 
in the appeal on points of law.  
In the civil matter, there are no legal norms sanctioning the nonobservance of the 
decisions of the Supreme Court given on points of law. By way of interpretation it may be 
inferred that such a sanction in the regulations of Article 488 paragraph (1) point 8 Civil 
Procedure Code, establishing as cassation grounds of the appealing decision, the violation or 
wrong application of the substantive law norms. Nevertheless, such an interpretation of the 
above named law texts is debatable, as such as emphasized in the literature in specialty, the 
very  interpretation  itself  of  the  Supreme  Court  will  be  implicitly  brought  into  question, 
eventually  it  could  be  invoked  only  as  argument  in  supporting  the  “legal”  grounds  of 
cassation. In any case, it by itself does not constitute such grounds
9. 
In the Criminal Proceeding Code the cases to which cassation appeal can be done are 
regulated by the provisions of Article 438. In our opinion neither of these cases can be 
interpreted in the meaning that it is sa nctioning the nonobservance of the compulsoriness of 
decisions given by the High Court of Cassation and Justice, through which was solved an 
appeal on points of law. In the actual criminal trial regulation, only by the interpretation way 
is possible to reach to the conclusion of sanctioning by the appeal court of non-abiding such a 
decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice. Having into consideration the provisions 
of Article 385
9 paragraph  (1)
  point  17
1 Criminal  Procedure  Code  according  to  which  the 
decisions are subject to cassation, if they are contrary to the law or when through the decision 
it was done a wrong application of the law. It worth mentioning that such dispositions were 
abrogated by Article 1 point 185 of the Law no. 356/2006, but by Decision no. 783 / 2009 the 
Constitutional Court declared such regulations as unconstitutional. For our research topic the 
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arguments of the Constitutional Court are of interest, according to which, Article 146 letter d 
of the Constitution does not exempt from the constitutionality control the abrogation legal 
provisions and, in case it is ascertained their unconstitutionality, they cease their legal effects 
within the conditions foreseen by Article 147 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, and the legal 
provisions that constituted the substance of abrogation, keep producing effects.  
Another aspect we wish to emphasize is that the Supreme Court has no legitimacy in 
conferring the force of an authentic interpretation to the legal norms. Such an interpretation is 
of the exclusive competence of the legislator. In the procedure of appeal on points of law, the 
High Court of Cassation and Justice makes a synthesis of the decisions given in relation to a 
certain  law  issue,  ruling  on  its  correctitude,  conferring  at  the  same  time,  a  compulsory 
interpretation” of the law aspects solved differently by the law courts.
10  
The  question  arises  if  the  decisions  handed  down  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  this 
procedure are formal springs of law. Constantly, in the literature in specialty the notion of 
spring of law is defined as “the form of expressing the judicial norms that are determined by 
their enactment or sanctioning by the state”
 11. In our opinion, the decisions rendered by the 
High Court of Cassation and Justice cannot be springs of the law because they cannot contain 
law norms. Moreover, in our legal system the jurisprudence is not a formal spring of law. In 
this respect, the Constitutional Court stated: “The interpretative solutions given in the appeal 
on points of law named “interpretations of law” cannot be considered springs of law, in the 
usual meaning of this term
12. Such interpretative solutions, constant and unitary, that do not 
concern certain parties and have no effect on the prior given solutions that entered the res 
judicata, are invoked by the doctrine as a judicial precedent, being considered by the legal 
literature “secondary springs of law” or “interpretative springs”. In relation to the foregoing, 
we express our opinion that these decisions can be considered as sources of law, but not 
formal springs of law, opinion consistent with the Constitutional Court jurisprudence.  
Another aspect we consider relates to the time at which the decisions given in the 
resolution of the appeals on points of law, start enforcing judicial effects. According to the 
procedural provisions “the decisions are published in Romania’s Official Gazette – Part I, and 
on the internet page of the High Court of Cassation and Justice. These are brought to the 
knowledge of the courts also by the Ministry of Justice”. From the interpretation of the legal 
dispositions results that such decisions cannot produce judicial effects with their ruling and 
their effects are only for the future. The decisions’ publishing on the internet page of the High 
Court of Cassation and Justice and their communication to the courts by the Ministry of 
Justice cannot be considered as moments since when they start producing effects because the 
legislator did not foresee expressly this fact, and much more, neither of the above named 
procedures has presently in the Romanian Law the judicial value of the act of communication 
or publishing. We consider that the moment since when the decisions ruled in the procedure 
of appeal on points of law start producing judicial effects is the one of publishing in the 
Official Gazette. This solution is imposed by the general binding character of the decisions, 
and also by their quality as source of the law, which clearly distinguish them in terms of legal 
nature from other types of judgments. 
The Civil Procedure Code, by Article 518, comes to clarify, at least in the civil matter, the 
issue of the effect of decisions on points of law. The normative regulations state that: “the decision on 
points of law ceases its applicability since the date of amending, abrogation or finding unconstitutional 
the statutory provision that made the object of the interpretation”. The Criminal Procedure Code does 
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not contain such regulations and therefore, in the criminal matter, remains opened the problem of 
applicability  of  the  decisions  on  points  of  law  in  the  hypothesis  of  abrogation  or  finding 
unconstitutional the statutory provision that made the object of the interpretation. It is necessary that 
the legislator intervenes to regulate in a unitary manner this aspect in the sphere of criminal justice. 
Before referring to the recent jurisprudence of our constitutional court in this matter, 
we  consider  appropriate  to  our  research  topic  to  emphasize  briefly  the  nature  of  the 
relationships between the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the decisions of the High 
Court of Cassation and Justice ruled on points of law
13. The first distinctive note is with 
regard to the effects of the two categories of decisions: the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court are compulsory in general, therefore not only for the law courts and including for the 
Supreme Court, but also for any other law topic. In contrast, the decisions of the High Court 
of Cassation and Justice ruled in the procedure of appeal on points of law are compulsory 
only for the law courts. Another aspect that distinguishes the two categories of legal acts is 
represented by the different nature of litigations that are resolved. The decisions of the 
Constitutional Court are rendered only to resolute a constitutional litigation and have as object 
the verification and analysis of the consistency or not of the legal norms examined with the 
Fundamental Law. The decisions of the Supreme Court are exclusively given with the 
purpose of a unitary interpretation and application of  the law by the law courts and they 
concern the compliance or not of the law courts’ practice in the authentic meaning of the legal 
provisions examined. 
The Constitutional Court stated constantly in its jurisprudence that starting with 2000, 
in  the  exercising  of  the  responsibilities  provided  by  Article  126  paragraph  (3)  of  the 
Constitution, the High Court of Cassation and Justice has the obligation to provide the unitary 
interpretation  and  application  of  the  law  by  the  law  courts,  with  the  observance  of  the 
fundamental principle of the separation of powers consecrated by Article 1 paragraph (4) of 
Romania Constitution. The Supreme Court does not have the constitutional competence to 
establish, amend or abrogate the judicial norms with law powers, or to do their control of 
constitutionality.  The  interpretations  given  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  the  law  matters  is 
mandatory for the other courts in as far as its objective is to promote a correct interpretation to 
the  legal  norms  in  force,  and  not  to  elaborate  new  norms.  One  cannot  consider  that  the 
decision rendered by the High Court of cassation and Justice, in such appeals, would represent 
a task aiming at the law making prerogative, situation in which the named text would violate 
the provisions of Article 58 paragraph 1 of Constitution. 
14 
Starting from a comprehensive jurisprudence analysis, the authors of a recent study
15 
emphasize: “The decisions thus ruled have the role to give a correct interpretation to law 
matters  over  which  they  have  appeal  on  points  of  law;  however,  proceeding  to  such  an 
analysis, the High Court of Cassation and Justice is forbidden to violate the competence of the 
legislative power or executive power or that of the Constitutional Court.   Therefore, this 
instrument is and remains a tool for the law interpretation and application, so like any other 
court decision, it cannot constitute a spring of law in the Romanian constitutional system”
16. 
We share the view expressed. 
It is necessary to notice the limits of the control of constitutionality related to the 
decisions ruled by the Supreme Court in the procedure of appeal on points of law. 
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Constantly, until recently, the Constitutional Court refused to arrogate such a power, 
emphasizing the limits for constitutionality control in respect to the decisions ruled by the 
Supreme Court in the procedure for appeal on points of law. The Constitutional Court stated 
that a decision rendered on points of law cannot constitute an object of censorship of the 
constitutional litigation court
17. Recently the Constitutional Court by Decision no. 854/2011
18 
confirmed  its  previous  case  law.  The  Constitutional  Court  stated  that  “  in  regard  to  the 
censuring  of  the  provisions  of  a  decision  given  in  an  appeal  on  points  of  law,  it  cannot 
constitute  an  object  of  exception  of  unconstitutionality,  being  from  this  perspective, 
inadmissible , because the constitutional litigation court, in agreement with the provisions of 
Article 146 of the fundamental law, has not the competence of censoring the constitutionality 
of the statutory decisions, no matter if they are  rule in the interpretation of some common law 
matters or in view of a unitary interpretation or application of the law”. There are some 
nuance  aspects  in  the  constitutional  court  jurisprudence.  Thus,  quite  recently  the 
Constitutional Court emphasized: “The circumstance that throughout a decision given in an 
appeal on points of law, a certain interpretation is given to a legal text, is not to be converted 
in  a  non-receiving  ending  that  obliges  the  Court,  which  despite  its  guarantor  role  of  the 
Constitution supremacy, not to analyze the text in question, in the interpretation given by the 
Supreme Court”
19. 
The  recent  doctrine  expresses  a  similar  point  of  view,  in  the  meaning  that  the 
Constitutional Court has the competence to establish the non constitutionality of the statutory 
norm in the interpretation given by the High Court of Cassation and Justice:”Having into 
consideration those mentioned above, it  comes  out  that the High Court of Cassation  and 
Justice, being held by the decisions of the Constitutional Court on the track of a decision 
rendered in resolution of  an appeal on points of law, cannot establish the application of an 
interpretation which per se would give a sense of unconstitutionality to the norm interpreted. 
Therefore the Court has the competence to establish the unconstitutionality of the norm in the 
interpretation given by the High Court of Cassation and Justice in the situation in which: 
-The Supreme Court by interpreting the norm disobeyed an interpretative decision 
ruled by the Constitutional Court in regard to that statutory norm; 
- The Supreme Court by interpreting the norm exceeded the jurisdiction of the law 
legislative power (judicial power n. m.); 
-  The  Supreme  Court  interpreted  that  norm  in  a  manner  capable  to  breach  the 
fundamental rights and freedoms”.   
Nevertheless it is acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to declare 
the unconstitutionality of the law norm in the interpretation conferred through the decision 
ruled by the High Court of Cassation and Justice, but not the unconstitutionality in itself of 
the decision through which was resolved the appeal on points of law. 
The Decision no. 206 on 29
th of April 2013 of the Constitutional Court
20 represents in 
our opinion, a legal revival in the matter of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, 
because it clarifies the relationship between the decisions of this Court, and on the other side, 
the decisions of the High Court of Cassation  and Justice ruled on points of law, and also a 
reconsidering of the competence of the Constitutional Court to censor under the aspect of this 
decision’s constitutionality. 
From considerations of the decision to which we made referral it comes out that the 
Constitutional  Court  was  informed  about  the  exception  of  non-constitutionality  of  the 
provisions of Article 414
5 paragraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The authors of the 
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non-constitutionality  exception  consider  the  text  criticized  as  unconstitutional,  because  it 
establishes the binding compulsory nature of the interpretations given in the law matters, 
judged by the High Court of Cassation and Justice by means of appeal on points of law, and 
thus are violated the provisions of Constitutions regarding the separation and balance of the 
powers in the state, the equality before the law, the free access to the justice and last, the role 
of the Parliament as a sole legislative authority.  
Concretely, the authors of the information towards the Constitutional Court have in 
consideration the decision no. 8/ 2010 given by the High Court of Cassation and Justice, in 
the procedure of appeal on points of law, by which it was admitted the appeal made by the 
General Attorney of the Prosecution besides the High Court of Cassation and Justice with 
regard to the consequences of the decisions of the Constitutional Court no. 62 / 2007 on the 
activity of the provisions of Articles 205, 206 and 207 of the Criminal Code. The Supreme 
Court  established  that:  ”The  rules  incriminating  the  insult  and  defamation  contained  by 
Article 205 and 206 of the Criminal Code, and also the provisions of Article 207 of the 
Criminal Code regarding the proof of truth, abrogated by the provisions of Article 1 point 56 
of the Law no. 278/2006, provisions declared unconstitutional through the decision no. 62 on 
January 18
th 2007 of the Constitutional Court, are not in force”.  
At  the  end  of  this  comprehensive  and  pertinent  argumentation,  the  Constitutional 
Court admits the exception of unconstitutionality having as objective the provisions of Article 
414
5 paragraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code and finds that the “interpretation given to 
the the law matters, judged by the decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice  - 
United  Sections  no.  8  on  October  18
th  2010  …  is  unconstitutional,  contravening  to  the 
provisions of Article 1 paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 and Article 126 paragraph (3), Article 142 
paragraph (1) and  Article 147 paragraph (1) and (4) of the Constitution and the decision of 
the Constitutional Court no. 62 on January 18
th 2007”. In support of this solution the Court 
notes that it is imposed the sanctioning of any interpretation of the statutory norms criticized 
for  unconstitutionality  that  regulates  the  obligation  of  the  clarifications  given  in  the  law 
matters by means of appeal on points of law, in the sense that it would offer to the Supreme 
Court the possibility that by this way, within the grounds of an infra-constitutional norm, to 
give compulsory interpretations that contravene to the Constitution and to the Constitutional 
Courts’ decisions.  From the contents of the decision clearly results that our Constitutional 
Court ruled on the constitutionality of the decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice 
through  which  solved  an  appeal  on  points  of  law.  It  is  a  radical  change  of  the  previous 
jurisprudence through which constantly were rejected as inadmissible the complaints with 
constitutionality of such decisions. 
The  decision  no.  206/2013  of  the  Constitutional  Court  presents  a  technical  and 
practical importance for many aspects, of which we remember:  
1.  The  Constitutional  Court  declared  itself  competent  to  rule  on  the 
constitutionality of the decisions delivered by the High Court of Cassation and Justice in the 
proceeding of appeal on points of law, which fact changes the previous jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court. We appreciate that the solution is correct even if neither the Basic Law 
nor the the special law for the Constitutional Court’s organizing foresee expressly such  a 
material prerogative. The legal basis is that any legal act of interpretation of such a judicial 
norm, mostly when it is about a compulsory judgment of a law court, cannot be dissociated by 
the  judicial  norm  interpreted.  In  consequence,  the  Constitutional  Court  ruling  on  the 
constitutionality of the legal  provisions  that establish  the compulsoriness  of the decisions 
rendered  in  the  appeal  on  points  of  law,  has  the  competence  to  examine  concretely  any 
judgment of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, that confers an interpretation to a text of 
law and establishes a compulsory interpretation of law for the law courts. There is no „non-
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invoking the unconstitutionality of a decision rendered by the High Court of Cassation and 
Justice in the proceeding of appeal on points of law.  
2. The  Constitutional  Court  clarifies  the  relationships  existing  between  the 
decisions of this law court, and on the other side, the decisions ruled by the High Court of 
Cassation and Justice. The interpretation conferred to the infra-constitutional law texts and the 
compulsory  interpretations  of  law  of  the  Supreme  Court  cannot  contravene  either  to  the 
Constitution or to the decisions of the Constitutional Court.  
3.  We  appreciate  that  new  possibility  opens  for  the  notification  of  the 
Constitutional  Court  in  the  procedure  of  exception  of  unconstitutionality.  Thus  the 
participants in the civil or criminal suits or court, ex officio, may appeal to the Constitutional 
Court,  a  plea  of  unconstitutionality,  having  as  object  the  statutory  regulations,  but  with 
specific reference to a decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice in the proceeding 
of appeal on points of law, if appreciated that throughout of the compulsory interpretations of 
the  law,  the  constitutional  regulations  or  the  decisions  of  the  Constitutional  Court  are 
contravened.  In  such  a  circumstance,  the  Constitutional  Court  can  ascertain  the 
constitutionality of the the legal regulations mentioned in the exception of unconstitutionality, 
but may rule on the unconstitutionality of the decisions  through which is solved the appeal on 
points of law, to the extent they conflict with the provisions of the Constitution or with the 
Constitutional Court decisions. 
4.  This decision, the ideas contained in the motivation constitute an argument 
for the legitimacy of the common law courts to examine the constitutionality of some legal 
acts, other than those that are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 
Obviously the examination of constitutionality does not always equate with the right of the 
courts to rule on the constitutionality of such legal acts. 
The  recent  jurisprudence  of  some  Law  Courts  confirms  such  an  interpretation 
regarding the possibility for the referral of the Constitutional Court with the verification of 
constitutionality  of  a  law  text  in  the  interpretation  conferred  to  it  by  the  High  Court  of 
Cassation and Justice as a result of a settlement of an appeal on points of law.  
The Court of Appeal Pitesti by the Criminal Concluding no. 876/R on December 2013 
ordered  the  referral  of  the  Constitutional  Court  with  the  exception  of  unconstitutionality 
raised by the Indicted, regarding the provisions of art 86/4 paragraph I in relation to item 83 
paragraph I of the previous Criminal Code, in the interpretation conferred by the decision 
I/2011 of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, pronounced in solving an appeal on points 
of law. 
Relevant  for  our  research  theme  are  the  following  aspects  arising  from  the 
considerations of the court decision. The judicial court held admissible the request for referral 
to  the  Constitutional  Court  in  relation  to  the  provisions  of  art.  29  Law  No.  47  /  1992, 
republished and with referring to decision No. 206/2013 of the Constitutional Court.  It held 
that the referral of the Constitutional Court for the exception of unconstitutionality, having as 
object a decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice pronounced in the procedure of 
appeal on points of law, is admissible, even if the provisions of art. 146 of the Constitution 
and  respectively,  those  included  in  the  Law  no.  47/  1992  republished,  do  not  expressly 
regulate such a competence of the constitutional court. The decision of the Supreme Court is 
an act of interpretation of a judicial norm and therefore, makes one common body with the 
judicial norm which they interpret. Consequently, the examining of constitutionality of the 
legal text has as object, implicitly the examining of the interpretative act constitutionality.  
The second argument to which the court refers to in justifying the admissibility of the 
request  for  the  referral  of  the  Constitutional  Court  refers  to  the  jurisprudence  of  the 
constitutional controlling court. The decision No. 206/2013 of the Constitutional Court has 
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referral.  It  is  mentioned  in  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  Piteşti:  “therefore  the 
Constitutional Court returned to its jurisprudence and ruled out that it has competence to 
adjudicate also over the decisions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice given in the 
procedure of appeal on points of law”. 
We appreciate as pertinent the arguments of the Court of Appeal Piteşti having into 
consideration the mandatory character of the decisions of Constitutional Court, in compliance 
with the provisions of art. 147 paragraph (4) of the Constitution. Certainly the compulsoriness 
of the decisions does not transform them into formal springs of law, but can be a juridical 
source to argue in favor of such a solution. 
The case is in pending for solving by the Constitutional Court. 
3. Conclusions  
In relation to the foregoing, we appreciate that the judge has the possibility to notify to 
the Constitutional Court, for ascertaining the unconstitutionality of a decision ruled on points 
of law, certainly by invoking the statutory regulations interpreted throughout the respective 
decision, with referral to the constitutional norms violated by the High Court of Cassation and 
Justice through the compulsory interpretation given and, such as the case be, with referral to 
the decisions of the Constitutional Court whose general binding effect was not observed by 
the Supreme Court by the judgment ruled in resolving the appeal on points of law. 
It is obvious that, under the conditions mentioned before, deduced from the contents of 
the decision no. 206/2013, the Constitutional Court may find unconstitutional such a decision. 
Worth mentioning that the decision of the Constitutional Court being binding has as a lawful 
consequence the cessation of the effects of the decision of the High Court of cassation and 
Justice  for  all  law  courts  and  not  only  for  the  specific  case  deducted  concretely  to  the 
judgment. Therefore this is another termination situation of the effects of the decisions ruled 
for resolving the appeals on points of law.  
In the concept of the Romanian constituent legislator the control of constitutionality 
done by the Constitutional Court has as objective only the law as a legal act of the Parliament, 
or the statutory regulations with a legal force equal with that of the law.  In relation to this 
aspect in the doctrine is claimed that the issue of the control of constitutionality does not arise 
in the same terms for the legal acts with administrative character or the judicial acts of the law 
courts. The control of lawfulness and implicitly that of the constitutionality of the legal acts 
issued  by  the  administration  authorities  or  the  law  courts  is  performed  within  a  judicial 
control, in compliance with the material competences of the law courts
21. 
Such a legal reality, which is determined by the rules of Constitution, leaves outside 
the  control  of  legality  and  implicitly  of  constitutional ity,  categories  of  important  legal 
documents. We consider the decisions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice in solving 
appeals on points of law. As noted before the decisions ruled by the Supreme Court in this 
procedure, throughout the solutions adopted, may be unconstitutional at least by exceeding 
the limits of the judicial powers. The unconstitutionality of these legal acts may consist in the 
unjustified restraining of the exercising of some rights and fundamental liberties recognized 
and guaranteed by the Constitution or in violating some of the Constitutional Court decisions.  
The lack of statutory regulations that establish the control of constitutionality by 
means of the Constitutional Court over the decisions ruled in the procedure of appeal o n 
points of law, is likely to allow the excess of power in the Supreme Court’s activity with 
serious  consequences  on  the  compliance  of  the  lawful  state  requirements,  citizens’ 
fundamental human rights and freedom. 
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There are other categories of legal acts that not only that they do not make the subject 
of the Constitutional reviewing but are also exempted from the judicial review. According to 
the provisions of Article 126 paragraph 6 of Constitution and Article 5 of the Administrative 
Litigation Law no. 554/2004, the acts that concern the relations with the Parliament and acts 
of military Command, cannot be subject to Constitutionality reviewing. This matter requires a 
separate analysis. In this context we emphasize only the fact the contemporary reality has 
shown the existence of legal acts of the executive in the relationship with the Parliament that 
are likely to violate seriously the letter and spirit of Constitution. The Parliamentary control of 
these acts is not sufficient to ensure the supremacy of Constitution and the requirements for 
democracy of the lawful state.  
For our topic of research it is  important to  emphasize that there are Constitutions 
stipulating  the  competence  of  the  Constitutional  Courts  to  exercise  the  constitutionality 
review over other categories of individual and normative legal acts and not only on laws. 
Thus, the Belgian Constitutional Court is competent to exercise control, when being notified 
about  a  jurisdiction  regarding  the  compliance  with  the  rules  for  the  division  of  powers 
between state authorities. The German Constitutional Court has the competence to exercise a 
subsequent specific control over some legal or administrative acts at the notification of the 
court  or  the  direct  notifying  from  the  citizens,  by  constitutional  appeal.  Similarly,  Spain 
Constitution on 1978 stipulated the competence of the Constitutional Court, by way of “de 
amparo” appeal proceeding, to verify the the constitutionality of some final judgments. An 
illustrative example is Hungary, where the Constitutional Court exercises a posteriori abstract 
or concrete on delegated acts and on ministerial acts. 
All these arguments entitle us to support, along with other authors
22,, the proposal for 
ferenda law that in the light of revising the Constitution to be provided the competence of the 
Constitutional Court to exercise the constitutional control on the decisions ruled by the High 
Court of Cassation and Justice in the appeal on points of law procedure and on the legal acts 
exempted from the judicial reviewing. The subjects of law that may notify the Constitutional 
Court in such a procedure may be: the General Prosecutor of the Prosecution besides the High 
Court of Cassation and Justice, the People’s Lawyer and courts. 
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